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Abstract: In face of the multiple controversies surrounding the DSM process in general and the development of
DSM-5 in particular, we have organized a discussion around what we consider six essential questions in further
work on the DSM. The six questions involve: 1) the nature of a mental disorder; 2) the definition of mental disorder;
3) the issue of whether, in the current state of psychiatric science, DSM-5 should assume a cautious, conservative
posture or an assertive, transformative posture; 4) the role of pragmatic considerations in the construction of DSM-5;
5) the issue of utility of the DSM – whether DSM-III and IV have been designed more for clinicians or researchers,
and how this conflict should be dealt with in the new manual; and 6) the possibility and advisability, given all the
problems with DSM-III and IV, of designing a different diagnostic system. Part I of this article took up the first two
questions. Part II will take up the second two questions. Question 3 deals with the question as to whether DSM-V
should assume a conservative or assertive posture in making changes from DSM-IV. That question in turn breaks
down into discussion of diagnoses that depend on, and aim toward, empirical, scientific validation, and diagnoses
that are more value-laden and less amenable to scientific validation. Question 4 takes up the role of pragmatic
consideration in a psychiatric nosology, whether the purely empirical considerations need to be tempered by
considerations of practical consequence. As in Part 1 of this article, the general introduction, as well as the
introductions and conclusions for the specific questions, are written by James Phillips, and the responses to
commentaries are written by Allen Frances.
General introduction
For the full text of the General Introduction to the entire
article, the reader is referred to Part 1 [1]. The General
Introduction reviewed the history of the article, which
originated in a controversy initiated by Robert Spitzer
and Allen Frances, Chairmen respectively of the DSM-III
and DSM-IV Task Forces, over the ongoing work of the
DSM-5 Task Force and Work Groups. In a series of arti-
cles and blog postings in Psychiatric Times, Frances (at
times with Spitzer) carried out a sustained critique of the
DSM-5 work in which he focused both on issues of
transparency and issues of process and content [2-15].
In the course of this debate over DSM-5 I proposed to
Allen in early 2010 that we use the pages of the Bulletin of
the Association for the Advancement of Philosophy and
Psychiatry (of which I am Editor) to expand and bring
more voices into the discussion. This led to two issues of
the Bulletin in2010 devoted to conceptual issues in DSM-5
[16,17]. (Vol 17, No 1 of the AAPP Bulletin will be referred
to as Bulletin 1, and Vol 17, No 2 will be referred to as Bul-
letin 2. Both are available at http://alien.dowling.edu/~cper-
ring/aapp/bulletin.htm.) Interest in this topic is reflected in
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on Frances’ extended response in the first issue, and his
responses to the commentaries, reached over 70,000 words.
Also in 2010, as Frances continued his critique through
blog postings in Psychiatric Times, John Sadler and I began
a series of regular, DSM-5 conceptual issues blogs in the
same journal [18-31].
With the success of the Bulletin symposium, we
approached the editor of PEHM, James Giordano, about
using the pages of PEHM to continue the DSM-5 discus-
sion under a different format, and with the goal of reaching
a broader audience. The new format would be a series of
“essential questions” for DSM-5, commentaries by a series
of individuals (some of them commentators from the Bul-
letin issues, others making a first appearance in this article),
and responses to the commentaries by Frances. Such is the
origin of this article. (The general introduction, individual
introductions, and conclusion are written by this author
(JP), the responses by Allen Frances.
For this exercise we have distilled the wide-ranging
discussions from the Bulletin issues into six questions: 1)
the nature of a mental disorder; 2) the definition of mental
disorder; 3) the issue of whether, in the current state of psy-
chiatric science, DSM-5 should assume a cautious, conser-
vative posture or an assertive, transformative posture; 4)
the role of pragmatic considerations in the construction of
DSM-5; 5) the issue of utility of the DSM – whether DSM-
III and IV have been designed more for clinicians or
researchers, and how this conflict should be dealt with in
the new manual; and 6) the possibility and advisability,
given all the problems with DSM-III and IV, of designing a
different diagnostic system. Part 1 [1] of this article covered
the first two questions. This text, Part 2, covers the third
and fourth questions.
Question #3: What are the benefits and risks of
conservatism?
Given the state of the science of psychiatric disorders,
should we design DSM-5 in a conservative manner, with
minimal change, or do the state of psychiatric science
and the problems in DSM-IV dictate major change?
Introduction
By way of introducing this question, I will underline two
points that play a role in the discussion. The first
involves the validity status of the DSM-IV diagnoses; the
second involves the role of values in DSM-IV.
Regarding the first point, virtually all discussants – in
this article, in the Bulletin discussions [16,17], and in the
article by Regier [32] and colleagues cited in the general
introduction – agree on a number of conclusions about
the DSMs: that the DSM-IV categorical profiles often do
not adequately reflect the heterogeneity of presentation
in individuals grouped under a particular category, that
the operationally defined categories, while achieving the
reliability that was their goal and in that way facilitating
research across different settings, also inhibit research
[33] by constricting it to the boundaries of the diagnostic
criteria, that the diagnostic constructs create a high rate
of comorbidity, as well as a high rate of NOS diagnoses,
that most of the diagnoses fail the test of the original
Robins and Guze [34], as well as the additional Kendler,
[35] validators, that current findings in genetics and
neuroscience do not match up with the DSM-IV categories,
and finally that the research findings of molecular genetics
and neuroscience regarding psychopathology are at this
point quite unsettled.
Given this agreement on such a large number of issues
about DSM-IV, it is striking that different commentators
draw dramatically different conclusions from them: one
group arguing that the problems of DSM-IV and the
current state of psychiatric science lead us to a conservative
recommendation of minimal change in DSM-5; the other
group arguing that the same set of circumstances leads us
to a non-conservative recommendation of maximal change.
As we know, Allen Frances argued in blogs, articles, and in
his Bulletin 1 Philosophyland piece, for the conservative ap-
proach. Commentators in the Bulletin discussions argued
for or against him: Piasecki and Antonuccio (Bulletin 2,
p. 15) and Phillips (Bulletin 1, p. 10) taking the conservative
p o s i t i o n ,a n dG h a e m i( B u l l e t i n1 ,p .3&B u l l e t i n2 ,p .3 3 ) ,
Waterman and Curley (Bulletin 1, p. 19), and Waterman
(Bulletin 2, p. 29) taking an activist stance. That debate
continues in the commentaries below.
Regarding the debate, let me refer to a recent piece by
Freeman Dyson in the New York Review of Books.W r i t i n g
about the scientific process, Dyson says:
The public has a distorted view of science, because
children are taught in school that science is a
collection of firmly established truths. In fact, science is
not a collection of truth. It is a continuing exploration of
mysteries. Wherever we go exploring in the world
around us, we fine mysteries. Our planet is covered by
continents and oceans whose origin we cannot explain.
O u ra t m o s p h e r ei sc o n s t a n t l ys t i r r e db yp o o r l y
understood disturbances that we call weather and
climate. The visible matter in the universe is outweighed
by a much larger quantity of dark invisible matter that
we do not understand at all. The origin of life is a total
mystery, and so is the existence of human consciousness.
We have no clear idea how the electrical discharges
occurring in nerve cells in our brains are connected with
our feelings and desires and actions...Science is the
some total of a great multitude of mysteries. It is an
unending argument between a great multitude of voices.
It resembles Wikipedia much more than it resembles the
Encyclopaedia Britannica [36].
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not a collection of truths”...but rather “a continuing ex-
ploration of mysteries.”, that might lead one toward the ac-
tivist stance, arguing that we needn’tw a i tf o rf i n a lt r u t h
from genetics and neuroscience to make changes in our
nosology, but rather see the latter as an ongoing, dynamic
process. If we assume this latter approach, the questions
become the practical ones of how to redesign the manual
in a way that allows for our tentative advances in scientific
understanding without creating more practical encum-
brance than benefit.
The counter argument is articulated by Frances and
others: that provisional changes made on the basis of genu-
ine, but provisional, scientific findings may well create
more harm than good, and that when dealing with suffer-
ing human beings, we had better be pretty sure of our “sci-
ence”–and of its effects – before making changes that will
affect how we deliver treatment. The stakes are high in this
discussion, and they will carry over into question #4, where
the issue of consequence enters the discussion.
The second point with which I introduce this question
involves the normative dimension of DSM-IV. In the
matter of values, questions regarding change or non-
change in the new manual are completely different from
those just discussed under the heading of conservatism
and validity. In that discussion the leading question was:
given that DSM-IV categories don’t achieve real scientific
validity, and that the proposed changes won’t accomplish
such validity either, are the proposed changes warranted
for whatever they will accomplish in inching forward to-
ward scientific validity, or will they create more chaos
and harm than benefit?
In the question of values, on the other hand, we
face a completely different kind of question: if there
are diagnostic categories in DSM-IV that primarily
represent value judgments, and whose validity will not
be settled by any science of the future, is there any
reason not to decide on them now? The obvious can-
didates for this discussion are, on the one hand, the
paraphilias, and on the other hand behavioral disorders
like Conduct Disorder and Antisocial Personality Disorder,
whose status as valid psychiatric disorders may not lend it-
self to a scientific answer. We certainly have an awkward
model for deciding this kind of question in the instance of
homosexuality, whose removal from the DSM was decided
by a membership vote in 1973. That vote was an acknow-
ledgment that the question was not to be decided by scien-
tific evidence.
Commentary: psychiatric nosology: what are the stakes?
G. Scott Waterman, M.D.
University of Vermont Department of Psychiatry
The stakes for everything seem higher these days than
ever before. A credit crisis in a small country reverbe-
rates through the world economy at the speed of
photons. Publication of political cartoons some find
offensive leads to deaths many miles away. Formulation
by Medicare officials of medical documentation and bill-
ing standards changes the practice of medicine and
causes the birth of entirely new industries to comply
with new regulations. And so it is with psychiatry: “offi-
cialness” has never been so official, magnifying the short-
comings of our diagnostic system manifold and
emphasizing the importance of seizing opportunities to
learn from the past and improve prospects for the
future.
It is a cliché that “the people” tend to be more
insightful than their leaders. In the case of the DSM
diagnostic system, while representatives of official
psychiatry debate the wisdom of a variety of potential
alterations, the rank and file have in significant ways
already passed judgment. In clinical settings it is widely
acknowledged that the phenotypes with which actual
patients present bear onlym i l dr e s e m b l a n c et ot h o s e
that define individual DSM entities. That ubiquitous
observation leads to what has become very familiar and
likely destructive cynicism among clinicians, clinician
educators, students, and residents about the diagnostic
enterprise. In research settings the unsuitability of the
DSM nosology for some of the most promising
domains of investigation – including genetics, epigen-
etics, and functional neuroimaging – has long been
understood, leading to an inevitably growing disjunc-
tion between what is being learned about the etio-
pathogenesis of psychopathology on the one hand and
official taxonomy of psychopathology on the other.
To the extent that the current approach to psychiatric
nosology is simply dying of its own flaws, the stakes
involved in reformulating it might not seem so high. But
despite its weaknesses, its influence is strong and persist-
ent in (among other contexts) psychiatric education and
training – precisely those venues to which we must look
for hope for the future of the discipline. Judging from
the time devoted to it and the examination questions
asked about it, imparting to students and residents the
algorithms by which DSM diagnoses are assigned is a
major curricular commitment. Among the many pro-
blems associated with that commitment is an essentialist
assumption about the nature of diagnostic categories
which, when juxtaposed with the failure of the taxonomy
either to describe or to explain phenotypes adequately,
results in the cynicism noted above. Other fallacies
imparted to our trainees through the vehicle of the DSM
are dualist conceptualizations that spuriously distinguish
‘mental’ from ‘physical’ (or, in the language of the DSM,
‘general medical’) illnesses, and the associated but more
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ferential diagnostic formulations of the following type:
Major depressive disorder, recurrent, severe with
psychotic features
Rule-out bipolar disorder, most recent episode
depressed, severe with psychotic features
Rule-out substance-induced mood disorder with
depressive features
Rule-out mood disorder due to a general medical
condition
Leaving aside the capital offenses committed against the
conventions of English syntax, the following questions
must be considered: 1) Is it likely that severe recurrent
psychotic depression, even among patients with no dis-
cernable histories of mania, shares more important fea-
tures with bipolar disorder than with unipolar depression?
How does expressing differential diagnosis in this way fa-
cilitate incorporation of forthcoming evidence on this
question? 2) How, exactly, does one “rule-out” any of
these entities? 3) Is it likely that substance use or “general
medical conditions” are themselves sufficient causes of (in
this case) full depressive syndromes, and thus represent
clinical entities distinct from primary or idiopathic mood
disorders? Is it more likely that inheritance of various
alleles in whose presence events in the external (i.e., social)
and internal (i.e., endocrine, psychoactive chemical, etc.)
environments are additively or synergistically pathogenic
underlie development of the illness in question? If so, how
(again) does this approach to differential diagnosis facili-
tate – or even allow – incorporation of such a possibility?
The conceptual handicaps we impose on our students
and residents are not limited to the fallacies inherent in
the diagnostic system we teach them; the opportunity cost
of precious curricular time and emphasis may be at least
as problematic. A major premise of this critique is that the
neo-Kraepelinian assumption that psychopathology pre-
sents as discrete categorical entities as defined in the DSM
is turning out to be inconsistent with the way genes and
environments act and interact to produce brain function
and dysfunction. And while it may be many years before
we have an understanding of these mechanisms that is suf-
ficient to form the basis of a new nosology, we are closer
than either the emphasis on the current system, or the
near absence in clinical education and training contexts of
discussion of etiopathogentic mechanisms, implies.
So does “the state of psychiatric science” dictate major
change for the DSM? It does – not because we have the
answers, but because we do not. We need a nosology
that is sufficiently nimble to be able to incorporate the
understandings that will be forthcoming, and sufficiently
tentative to allow those understandings to develop
among investigators, clinicians, and trainees alike. Tax-
onomy cannot lead conceptual innovation but can only as-
pire to reflect it. Perhaps most importantly, it should never
retard it. Our current one must be scaled back consider-
ably in both form (i.e., scrapping the multiaxial system)
and scope (i.e., acknowledging that not all conceivable per-
mutations of human distress or dysfunction need or
should be named). Those diagnostic entities that remain
should both describe and help us investigate the pheno-
types, etiopathogeneses, prognoses, and treatment
responses of the patients so categorized. This set of
recommendations is at once radical and conservative, am-
bitious and austere. The stakes involved demand such au-
dacious caution.
Commentary: science, conservative by nature
Michael Cerrulo, M.D.
University of Cincinnati Department of Psychiatry
Psychiatry is the last area of medicine to be based almost
exclusively on descriptive science. This in itself is not ne-
cessarily a criticism as every branch of medicine (and sci-
ence) must start with a descriptive knowledge of its
subject. Psychiatrists need not feel any inferiority to the
rest of medicine: rather we have simply chosen the most
difficult disorders of the most complicated organ, the
brain. Modern psychiatric nosology builds on Kraepelin’s
method of diagnosis based on longitudinal history and
current symptoms. The DSM-III and IV were refinements
in Kraepelin’s diagnostic systems that have proved incred-
ibly useful.
There have been impressive advances in neuroscience
in recent decades and an optimist could easily believe
that we appear to be on the verge of understanding the
etiology of some of the most severe mental illnesses.
Yet the reality is that at the current time we do not
have this understanding. The future is always notori-
ously difficult to predict and although we hope answers
are just around the corner it may be many more dec-
ades before real etiological models can be defined. There-
fore it is premature to talk about a paradigm change in the
DSM-V and the use of biomarkers and etiologically based
definitions of disease when neither exists in psychiatry.
Science by nature is always conservative. According to
Kuhn [37] each branch of science works within a paradigm
that encapsulates the basic understanding of the field.
When important new findings occur that can no longer be
incorporated into the current paradigm then conservatism
is forgotten and a major change occurs in the fundamental
principles of the field. The classic Kuhnian example of
paradigm charge is the overthrow of Newtonian physics by
relativity and quantum mechanics in the early part of the
twentieth century.
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psychiatry is based on Kraepelin’s method. Unless there
is overwhelming evidence to throw out this paradigm
then conventional wisdom (supported by the history of
science) suggests we make only small conservative
changes where necessary. Of course even these small
changes need to be supported by good empirical evi-
dence. But even supposing we had more information on
biomarkers and disease etiology, would these really ne-
cessitate a paradigm change? It seems a stretch to believe
lab tests will become the new goal standards that define
all mental illness. A more realistic appraisal seems to be
that lab tests will be incorporated into the current diag-
nostic system which will still require information on the
current and past course of symptoms.
There are also other more pragmatic worries about
any superfluous changes in our diagnostic criteria. Even
minor changes in diagnostic criteria could lead to signifi-
cant changes in the prevalence rates of the respective dis-
order. Thus public health consequences also need to be
considered before each potential change. Then there are
concerns about how insurance companies will take advan-
tage of any changes to deny coverage. Finally, changes in
many psychiatric diagnoses could have significant legal and
social implications (See my essay on the first question for a
justification as to why these pragmatic concerns and value
judgments are legitimate parts of our disease definition). In
total these many concerns suggest we take an extremely
conservative approach to changing our diagnostic system.
Commentary
Andrew Hinderliter, M.A.
University of Illinois Depart of Linguistics
In recent blog posts, Dr. Frances has acknowledged
that a serious problem with the DSM-IV’s conservative
approach to diagnostic change is “grandfather[ing] in
weak links.” In these posts are included responses from
myself [38] and Dr. Charles Moser [39] suggesting possible
solutions, and Dr. Frances’ responses.
To further thinking on this issue, I will focus on the
paraphilias—as did both my and Dr. Moser’s discussions—
because this is what my published work regarding the
DSM has dealt with and because it illustrates both the se-
vere problems that DSM-IV’s conservative approach to
diagnostic change can have in some areas and how the
DSM-5 spirit of innovation is not a viable solution.
Psychiatry has a long history of pathologizing sexual
variations, a clear case of medicalizing morality. In the
US the only variant sexuality to be removed from the
DSM has been homosexuality, and this would not have
happened without outside pressure from gay liberation
forcing the APA to deal with the issue. Several remaining
“perversions” illustrate one of the most embarrassing
consequences of DSM-IV’s conservative approach to
diagnostic change: though a medicalization of morality,
it is not even our morality. Viewed from the increasingly
dominant “between consenting adults” standard, the
DSM’s lumping together of cross-dressing and sex with
children is downright bizarre, but it should be remembered
that in the 1950s, cross-dressing was illegal in many parts
of the US. In recent years, some Scandinavian countries
have removed sadomasochism, transvestism, and fetishism
from their versions of the ICD, but they left in the illegal
disorders of sexual preference, making it clear that this is
still a medicalization of morality. But at least it is their mor-
ality. The DSM’s continued pathologizing of increasingly
accepted sexualities will increasingly be an embarrassment
to the APA.
If the divergence of the old and the new morality reveals
the most ridiculous consequence of grandfathering in the
paraphilias, the most pernicious effects are seen where the
old and new morality coincide. In the US, 20 states and
the federal government lock up certain offenders after
completing their sentences under Sexually Violent Preda-
tor (SVP) laws (mostly passed after the publication of
DSM-IV) which require a diagnosis of some mental dis-
order, the paraphilias and antisocial personality disorder
being the most commonly used. While the APA has his-
torically been strongly opposed to SVP commitment,
keeping the paraphilias in the DSM supports and main-
tains this.
Despite the APA’s historical opposition to SVP com-
mitment, the DSM-5 Paraphilias Subworkgroup is dem-
onstrating all-out support, revealing the folly of DSM-5’s
approach to innovation. In their literature reviews, lack
of concern for clinical utility is almost tangible. They ac-
knowledge that these diagnoses hurt “patients” and dis-
courage them from being honest, but they show no
interest in changing this. (I strongly encourage readers to
look at “APA Guidelines Ignored in Development of Diag-
nostic Criteria for Pedohebephilia” by a member of a pa-
tient advocacy group.) The Paraphilias Subworkgroup is
proposing to add paraphilic coercive disorder (PCD) to the
DSM, which would legitimate the current rogue use of
paraphilia NOS: nonconsent in SVP commitment. The
defense for adding PCD to the DSM has been given in two
reports by advisors of the Paraphilias Subworkgroup: one
written by the Treatment Director at an SVP commitment
center, and the other by an SVP prosecutor. Their newly
proposed diagnoses are actually being field tested in SVP
commitment centers, leaving no doubt about the purpose
of these diagnoses: they are not about helping patients, but
bringing about their demise.
Following a debate about these at the American Academy
of Psychiatry and Law about the proposed addition of
hypersexual disorder, PCD, and expanding pedophilia into
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the second and third and 29–2 against the first. At the
International Association for the Treatment of Sexual
Offenders, a non-binding vote was held regarding the ex-
pansion of pedophilia. The outcome: approximately 100–1
against.
A huge problem with DSM-5’s approach to innovation
is that, evidently, it only requires consensus among an
extremely small group of people. Taking a conservative
approach to diagnostic change can prevent this (i.e. do
damage control) but at the price of grandfathering in
even diagnoses that are clearing causing far more harm
than good. If psychiatry is a legitimate branch of medi-
cine aiming to alleviate human suffering rather than a
means—masquerading as medicine—of detaining unde-
sirables, the APA must get its house in order. Neither
the DSM-IV nor the DSM-5 approach to diagnostic
change can do this.
Allen Frances responds: To be or not to be conservative
Dr Phillips usefully frames the conservative issue along two
orthogonal dimensions – 1) what is most likely to further
the validation of psychiatric diagnoses and scientific
advances in the field? and; 2) how to deal with value judg-
ments that may not lend themselves to scientific validation.
Neither question has a simple right answer, but I think
conservatism trumps when one takes all the risks and
benefits into account.
The easiest question is whether DSM should be chan-
ged to further scientific advancement. The obvious an-
swer would be "of course, but": 1) We don't really know
which changes would improve science; 2) Changes may
retard science by making previous findings incompatible
with new ones; 3) DSM has a huge clinical responsibility
that must take priority – it cannot include diagnoses to
increase NIMH funding if such inclusion will also simul-
taneously result in excessive, false positive diagnoses and
over use of unnecessary and potentially harmful
medication.
Ic o m ea w a yc o n v i n c e dt h a tt h eD S M - I Vc o n s e r v a t i v e
position was absolutely right in trying to hold the line
against the rampant push for diagnostic inflation. Knowing
what we know now from subsequent events, there is reason
to question all three of the DSM-IV decisions that strayed
from strict conservatism – the inclusion of Bipolar II and
Asperger's, and a rewrite of the criteria for ADD. Each deci-
sion was made for excellent reasons that withstand the test
of time – but each led to an unexpected frenzy of diagnostic
enthusiasm that far overshot the mark beyond the useful
purpose of the DSM-IV intention.
I can't say it was a mistake to include these innovations
in DSM-IV, but I also can't say that their inclusion has
clearly resulted in more good than harm. We failed to
anticipate the outside forces that can greatly amplify the
impact of any DSM decision, especially the power of
drug company marketing to create the fads of Bipolar
and ADD diagnosis. We never envisioned that diagnoses
of autistic disorder could explode twenty-fold.
Any change in DSM can have powerful unintended
consequences that cannot be predicted or prevented.
The written word of DSM is likely to be loosely inter-
preted and misapplied in general practice. Because those
who write the words can exert little control over later
practice, the criteria should be as explicitly restrictive
and precise as possible.
I am much less confident in defending DSM-IV con-
servatism when it prevented the sunsetting of question-
able and potentially quite harmful diagnoses. Hinderliter
[38], Phillips [40], and Moser [39] make a persuasive case
that the high evidentiary requirement for change that
governed DSM-IV decisions should have been relaxed
for those problematic diagnoses that had been grandfath-
ered into DSM under looser previous standards.
Our rationale was reasonable, even if its results were
not always palatable. To keep the diagnostic system from
expanding wildly, we established extremely high thresh-
olds for change in DSM-IV. Substantial scientific evidence
was required for changes in either direction – those that
would add to the reach of the system, but also those that
would subtract from it. We feared that without clear and
high scientific thresholds, changes would be arbitrary, de-
stabilizing, and subject to personal whim.
This requirement did indeed permit the grandfathering
of diagnoses that would not have met the new much
higher standards for new suggestions.
I agree completely with Mr Hinderliter [38] that this
conservative approach has had unfortunate consequences
particularly in the paraphilia section. It also prevented us
from taking a stronger stand against the general problem
of diagnostic inflation.
We did not alter grandfathered suggestions because we
did not know how to do this in a way that would not be
arbitrary, controversial, and subject to whim. Dr Phillips
[40] suggests a solution that works in the abstract, but I
don't know how you would implement it in practice. I
see no obvious way of making the discrimination that is
central to his suggestion – between ‘real’ psychiatric dis-
orders that lend themselves to scientific judgments ver-
sus the nondisorders that call for value judgments. One
man's ‘real disorder’ is another man's value oriented
"non disorder" and how is one to tell them apart?
Dr Moser [39] has an extremely appealing alterna-
tive solution. Keep the grandfathered diagnoses in the
DSM, but (using the techniques of evidence based
medicine) give ratings that would guide consumers
about the confidence one can place in each disorder.
This might be a wonderful advance, but as always the
devil is in the details.
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Waterman's critique of DSM-IV, but think he underesti-
mates its value and more to the point offers no alternatives
or consideration of the risks and benefits of making
changes.
Response to Dr Cerrulo: I agree completely.
Response to Andrew Hinderliter: I agree completely
with Mr Hinderleiter on the recklessness of DSM-5 in
suggesting new and unproven paraphilias that would en-
courage the already grave existing misuse of psychiatric
diagnosis in the legal system. He and I might however part
company on the wisdom of removing existing diagnoses
from the nomenclature – particularly Pedophilia and Anti-
social Personality Disorder. He might see these as clearcut
value questions with an obvious right answer. I find the
situation more complicated and difficult. Both diagnoses
have a clinical tradition that stretches back more than a
century, a substantial body of research, and some clinical
and prognostic utility. I am not convinced they cause more
harm than good, and tie scores (or near tie scores) should
in my view always go to incumbency. But it would be valu-
able to have the discussion re sunsetting these and other
potentially weak diagnoses accompanied by a thorough
evaluation of the evidence.
Question #4: is pragmatism practical?
What roles do science and pragmatism play in the con-
struction of DSM-5? Does our science allow us to make
major decisions on a scientific basis? What role do prag-
matic considerations play, both when the science is
strong and when the science is weak?
Introduction
The introduction to this question must begin with the
same point that began the introduction to the previous
question: the agreement on the part of most discussants
regarding the weak scientific status of the DSM-IV diag-
noses. In the case of the previous question, the discus-
sion set off from that general agreement to the further
question as to whether the current state of psychiatric
science leads one to proceed cautiously or vigorously in
developing DSM-5. With Question 4, we question
whether, in the current situation of weak science – or
even in an imagined situation of strong science in the fu-
ture – pragmatic decisions should play a role in the con-
struction of the manual.
Let us begin with an understanding of how we will use
the word ‘pragmatic’. Omitting a long discussion of prag-
matism in philosophy as developed by Peirce, James, and
their heirs and adherents, we will understand ‘pragmatic’
in our discussion to refer to the practical consequences
of a diagnostic construction. We thus make a distinction
between the truth status of a diagnostic construct – its
scientific validity – and its consequences or effects
(again, acknowledging that in the pragmatic tradition,
the effects will be linked to the truth status). The poten-
tial consequences are many and varied: whether the diag-
nostic construct, with its set of diagnostic criteria, will
expand or limit the population covered by the construct,
whether (relatedly) it will create more false positives or
false negatives, whether it will create more or less zones
of rarity between one diagnosis and another, and whether
(again relatedly) it will separate off the diagnosis from
normality or tend to merge it at one end into normal
feeling and behavior.
We need to add that all of the above effects are subordin-
ate to a single overarching effect - the effect of change on
patient welfare. For this effect our shibboleth is the Hippo-
cratic maxim: Primum non nocere -F i r s t ,d on oh a r m .
The question arises: is there a conflict between science
and pragmatism in the DSM? In my opinion there is not.
The DSM does and must involve both. The DSM must
use the science that is available, but it must also make
countless judgment calls that are not grounded in solid
empirical evidence—and surely it makes sense to con-
sider practical consequences in doing the latter. First,
there is the question as to whether a condition should be
listed at all in the DSM as a disorder. As discussed in the
above question, various groups of “paraphilics,” for in-
stance, have protested as did homosexuals decades ago,
the pathologic status of their sexual difference. To invoke
a provocative example, what is the empirical evidence
that pedophilia is a psychiatric disorder, rather than sim-
ply a socially repellant behavior? A similar question,
raised and studied by John Sadler, involves the bad-con-
duct disorders such as Conduct Disorder and Antisocial
Personality Disorder [41,42].
Second, once a disorder is admitted into the DSM, we
make countless non-empirically based decisions about
the structure of the diagnostic criteria—what they are,
how many there are, how many are needed to declare
the diagnosis, etc. All such decisions utilize the available
empirical evidence, but they are hardly dictated by that
evidence. And where judgment comes in, so does consid-
eration of consequences. In the case of virtually every
diagnosis with diagnostic criteria, increasing the number
of required criteria limits the population and creates false
negatives, while decreasing the number of required cri-
teria has the opposite effect of expanding the population
and creating false positives.
Let us focus on an example: the criteria set for a major
depressive episode. The requirement of only 2 weeks of
symptoms, and only 5 of 9 of the criteria, may cast too
wide a net, create a huge population of patients with this
diagnosis, and bring in too many false positives. Do we
have a scientific basis for the judgment that someone
with one week of the required criteria does not suffer
from a major depressive episode but that someone with
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pressive episode? If not, then we have to decide whether
we are more concerned with overdiagnosing or under-
diagnosing major depression.
Then there are the much disputed sub-threshold con-
ditions, with most of the attention going to
Psychosis Risk Syndrome, now renamed Attenuated
Psychosis Syndrome and Disruptive Mood Dysregulation
Disorder (previously called Temper Dysregulation Dis-
order with Dysphoria). The first is considered a pro-
dromal schizophrenic condition and the second a
prodromal bipolar condition. In each case we debate the
pragmatic consequences of sticking these diagnostic
labels on young individuals (in the first case, even with
evidence that only a third of the so-labeled group will
emerge as schizophrenic). What are the practical conse-
quence of introducing or not introducing these diagnos-
tic categories?
Finally, there is the debate over whether we will be ad-
versely expanding the population of bipolar patients, and
expanding the use of potentially harmfully medications,
by shortening the number of days of hypomania required
to diagnose bipolar disorder. Science will certainly play a
role in this debate, follow-up studies showing whether
patients with brief hypomanic episodes become more
clearly bipolar, and whether early intervention decreases
progressive illness.
In none of these examples does there appear to be a
conflict between science and pragmatism, and in all of
them both science and pragmatism play a role in the de-
velopment of the diagnostic construct.
Commentary: the DSM and “do no harm:” is a radical
pragmatism sufficient?
Warren Kinghorn, MD
Duke University School of Medicine
In discussing the first question, Dr. Frances, in a help-
fully candid glimpse into the politics of psychiatric diag-
nostic classification, classifies himself as the second of
the five umpires in the “epistemologic game.” This
categorization would suggest that he is a realist with re-
gard to the ontology of “mental disorder”–for the sec-
ond umpire, the balls and strikes clearly exist
independently of the umpire’s judgment– and in fact
there are glimpses of realism in Frances’ account, as
when he holds that the NIMH Research Domain Criteria
(RDoC) project rather than DSM might “lead the future
charge in understanding psychopathology.” But this os-
tensive commitment to diagnostic realism is somewhat
undercut by Dr. Frances’ pragmatic and constructivist as-
sertion that “mental disorders don’t really live ‘out there’
waiting to be explained. They are constructs we have
made up . . .” Furthermore, for Frances it is pragmatic,
not realist, commitments which should guide revisions
to diagnostic criteria: DSM should be revised not when
new mental disorders “out there” are recognized (for
how, after all, would we know a “mental disorder” if we
saw one?) but rather when the consequences of a revi-
sion are likely to provide benefit to patients and, above
all, will do no (anticipated) harm – the position of um-
pire 4. DSM, for Frances, serves and should serve as a
regulatory and even disciplinary document demarcating
limits for the appropriate extension of psychiatric tech-
nology and for the appropriate use of psychiatry by par-
ticular interests (such as the state).
Frances is surely correct regarding the social function
and power of DSM and regarding the need to approach
potential revisions with extreme care. But his insightful
account begs the important question: who should decide?
Who should decide what “mistakes” and “problems” are,
or what “mental disorder” is, or what constitutes “harm,”
or what would render DSM “useful?” Should patients de-
cide? Should individual psychiatrists decide? Should the
Task Force decide? And on what grounds? And how
would we know if the judgments of any of these poten-
tial “deciders” were shaped, subtly and unconsciously, by
particular forces such as pharmaceutical marketing, con-
sumer-driven ideals of beauty and success, gender
stereotyping, and so on? Can psychiatric diagnosis ever
extricate itself definitively from Foucauldian and Szaszian
critique? It is difficult to see how Frances’ pragmatism
can ensure that diagnostic revisions will “do no harm” if
“harm” is itself a contested category.
If, as Frances argues, efforts to establish a consensual
and non-tautological account of “mental disorder” are
likely to fail, there would seem to be no way around
these questions. Psychiatric diagnostic classification, that
is, must be understood as a pragmatic and tradition-con-
stituted enterprise in which individuals and groups with
particular interests interpret research data (itself com-
piled and reported by individuals with particular inter-
ests) in such a way as to shape the use of psychiatry and
psychiatric technology in accord with these interests.
This recognition should, at the very least, provoke hu-
mility and non-defensive soul-searching among those
tasked with revising the DSM, since biases and moral
failures in the “deciders” would very likely become mani-
fest in their nosological decisions, and the ongoing cul-
tural acceptance and use of the DSM hinges on the
ongoing public credibility of these “deciders.” It is no
wonder that the DSM-5 architects, in the face of much
work in the contemporary philosophy of psychiatry, con-
tinue to speak in realist terms about syndromes “actually
present in nature” and a nosology which “[carves] nature
at its joints” [32, p. 645–8]. In the absence of a narrative
of progressive scientific discovery, would the social
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to hold?
Commentary: the ethical significance of pragmatic science
for DSM
Douglas Porter, M.D.
New Orleans, LA
The relationship between pragmatics and the science
of nosology is complex. But, for reasons that are ethically
significant, it is important to clarify that nosology is al-
ways already practical science. Nosology cannot be
understood in complete distinction from pragmatics.
Practical therapeutic concerns permeate the science of
nosology through and through, and there is no way to
make sense of nosology without keeping these concerns
in view. The practical concerns of nosology do not stand
in contradistinction to a scientific concern for objectivity.
On the contrary, the practical therapeutic concerns that
ground the science of nosology ground the demand for
scientific rigor; the type of scientific rigor that presents a
safeguard against idle empirical assertions that are more
akin to acts of wish fulfillment or confabulation than a
faithful reckoning with the world in which we live. While
the practical nature of nosology demonstrates the neces-
sity of objectivity, it also demonstrates that the concern
for objectivity, in and of itself, is insufficient. A collection
of undeniably objective yet arbitrary facts would hardly
make for a valid classificatory schema. There must be
some additional normative measure of the salience of the
objective data. The notion of practical science therefore
encompasses the concern for objectivity but extends be-
yond it to issues of relevance that are best justified in
terms of an ethical framework. Justifying the validity of
diagnostic constructs is not merely a matter of objectiv-
ity. This fact causes no end of semantic difficulty because
“validity” has become virtually synonymous with “object-
ively true” in the discourses of the sciences.
At times in the history of medicine the careful descrip-
tion of syndromes has been associated with the discovery
of singularly determining etiologies. There is no question
about the pragmatic therapeutic significance of these dis-
coveries. The influential criteria for validating psychiatric
diagnostic constructs outlined by Robins and Guze [34] are
compatible with the assumption that the signs and symp-
toms of mental disorders cluster together in syndromal
fashion due to an underlying mechanism that uniquely
determines the course of illness regardless of context. This
notion of “validity” is thoroughly entrenched. Kendell and
Jablensky [33] note that when diagnostic categories convey
information about outcome, treatment response, and eti-
ology they may be recognized for their “utility”. But, these
categories with utility must still be regarded as invalid if
they fail to reflect the type of context independent, singu-
larly determined entities that would clearly distinguish a
particular disorder from normality and all other disorders.
Indeed, while much ado has been made about the signifi-
cance of a shift from categorical to dimensional diagnoses,
it is apparently possible to make this shift while retaining
the firm conviction that valid disorders will carve nature at
the joints [32]. The dichotomy between “valid” disorders
and disorders with “utility” is misleading. It would appear
to indicate that this particular notion of validity transcends
pragmatic issues of utility. But, as I indicated earlier the
justification of validity in nosology necessarily extends be-
yond empirical issues to normative issues of relevance.
This burden of justification extends to the notion that
“truly” valid disorders have a singular essence that uniquely
explains their form of pathology. If singularly determining
etiologies existed for mental pathology they would hold
powerful explanatory value and great utility. But, it is un-
clear to me that it is “valid” to conceive of mental disorders
primarily in terms of simplistic singularly determining eti-
ologies when accumulating empirical evidence indicates
that the signs and symptoms of mental disorders develop
in a highly contingent manner through complex interac-
tions between biological factors and the environment. As
Kendler [43] notes, social and cultural factors and the
agency of the person with illness become entwined in their
own right as pertinent, but not singular, explanatory
factors.
Ultimately issues of validity will be decided not by em-
pirical data alone, but by measures of the relevance of
the empirical data. It is for this reason that I spoke of
the ethical significance of remembering the practical na-
ture of our science. Preoccupation with objective data
that hold no relevance for the science of therapeutics
makes for nosology that may be objectively valid but fails
to be ethically valid because it fails to maintain its prac-
tical relevance. The signs and symptoms associated with
DSM disorders may have been recognized as valid only
insofar as they reflected a singular underlying etiology,
but they carried ethical significance for different reasons.
The clusters of signs and symptoms detailed in the DSM
kept disorders relevant by keeping them firmly tied to
the real world concerns of people dealing with mental ill-
ness. Insisting that it is only valid to proceed with diag-
noses that submit to powerful singular forms of
explanation when real world concerns do not submit to
such explanation seems akin to looking for lost keys on
the street where the light is good, instead of looking on
the street where the keys were actually lost. To insist
upon a unitary explanation when it does no justice to
the complexity of the phenomena of concern can under-
mine the therapeutic relevance of nosology by prema-
turely marginalizing pertinent levels of explanations and
the types of therapeutic intervention for which they call.
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ters of utility belies the fundamental issue of relevance
for the practical science of nosology and the ethical form
of normative argument ultimately required to justify its
validity.
Commentary
Joel Paris, M.D.
McGill University Department of Psychiatry
While in principle, science should be the basis of any
diagnostic system, DSM has been seduced by the illusion
that advances in neuroscience provide empirical validity
for a new system. In reality, we do not know whether
conditions like schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, or obses-
sive compulsive disorder are true diseases.
Current diagnostic concepts tend to be more prag-
matic than scientific but have become reified with con-
stant use. DSM-5 needs to re-emphasize that its
classification can only be provisional.
In spite of all the progress that has been made in
neuroscience over the last few decades, we are no closer
to understanding the etiology and pathogenesis of men-
tal disorders than we were fifty years ago. Applying sci-
entific findings to the understanding of psychopathology
is a complex task that could require many decades more.
The idea that is often promulgated, that breakthroughs
are just around the corner, are at best hype and at worst
seriously misleading. Thus, DSM has no choice for the
foreseeable future but to continue with a classification
system based on phenomenological observation. For that
reason, more effort should be expended on psycho-
metrics and discriminant vaidity of measures, and less
on chimerical searches for neurophysiological or neuro-
chemical specifics. While the establishment of biological
markers must remain a long-term goal, DSM should be
written for 2013, not for 2063 or 2113.
Commentary
Joseph Pierre, M.D.
UCLA Department of Psychiatry
An ideal DSM would be based upon known “biopsy-
chosocial” etiologies and have wide-ranging contextual
utility, but until that ideal is achieved, competing utilities
must be carefully balanced. If, for example, scientific dis-
covery since 1994 had yielded the genetic basis for sev-
eral major psychiatric disorders, a new DSM-5 would
clearly be justified. “Pragmatic” considerations about the
implications to clinical therapeutics or public health pol-
icy would then have to follow. Instead, with the promise
of etiologically-based diagnoses still unrealized despite
scientific progress since 1994, all we really have are prag-
matic considerations about DSM revisions (or in arguing
against revisions altogether). Note that this isn’t quite
the same as saying that pragmatism is more important
when science is weak and vice-versa, but rather that
pragmatism should always be optimized given the exist-
ing state of scientific knowledge.
The case of “prodromal psychosis” or “psychosis risk
syndrome” offers a good example of the challenges in
balancing competing pragmatic considerations and con-
textual utilities in the face of a theory-driven (as opposed
to a fact-driven) proposed DSM revision. Current re-
search efforts to develop effective primary and secondary
preventative strategies for psychosis are ongoing and
worthwhile. However, research criteria for subjects
included in those studies have already been developed
and standardized, such that further scientific progress
doesn’t require a DSM revision. If it were the case that
these research criteria were fully validated, with a sub-
stantial majority of identified at-risk individuals inevit-
ably “converting” to psychosis, then creating a new
category of “psychosis risk syndrome” would be justified,
despite certain pragmatic difficulties (e.g. not knowing
how to best treat the condition). In that case, pragmatic
considerations would have to follow from the newfound
ability to reliably predict the development of a psychotic
disorder. In reality though, “false-positive” rates in stud-
ies of “prodromal psychosis” have been as high as 84% at
2-year follow-up [44], such that together with the lack of
knowledge about the risk/benefit profiles of putative
interventions, there is a solid case against inclusion
[44,45] in a DSM whose “highest priority has been to
provide a helpful guide to clinical practice [46].” Propo-
nents of the inclusion of “psychosis risk syndrome” in
DSM-5 view the data more optimistically [47], and argue
that DSM-5 inclusion would be helpful to promote fur-
ther funding of research in this area [48]. These pro and
con arguments are all based on the same scientific evi-
dence, but touch on different aspects of pragmatism and
contextual utility (i.e. will inclusion in DSM-5 be most
useful for patients, clinicians, or researchers?). Since con-
textual utilities are often conflicting, any final decision
about inclusion will inevitably be based upon pragmatic
choices that prioritize different risks and benefits.
The pragmatic concern that most intrigues me for DSM-
5 is the larger issue of “diagnostic expansion” in psychiatry
[49]. The number of psychiatric disorders has been increas-
ing since the first DSM, and many of the most controversial
newly proposed disorders for DSM-5 (including psychosis
risk syndrome) are those that seem to be encroaching on
normal behavior. This kind of expansion is occurring for
t h r e em a i nr e a s o n s .F i r s t ,w ei n c r e a s i n g l yr e c o g n i z et h a t
psychiatric symptoms exist on a continuum with normal
experiences (e.g. anxiety, sadness, aggression, age-related
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boundary between pathology and normality is inherently
difficult to define. Second, to an individual or clinician,
whether or not an individual meets criteria for a DSM dis-
order is less important than whether they are suffering. In-
deed, the presence of suffering is usually regarded as a
defining feature of “clinical significance” and therefore path-
ology in mental illness. As a result, if an individual is in dis-
tress and help-seeking, then treatment of some kind will
usually be offered, and having a diagnosis to justify that
intervention is incentivized. Third, treatment strategies,
whether psychological or pharmaceutical, have the potential
to help people with clearly pathological as well as “subclin-
ical” or “subthreshold” symptoms alike. All of these realities
d r i v eap s y c h i a t r i cm a r k e tt h a ti si n c r e a s i n g l ys h i f t i n gt o -
wards neuroenhancement, with increasingly blurry distinc-
tions between pathology and normality.
This shift has already prompted concerns about “dis-
ease mongering” [50] and other thorny ethical debates
[51,52], including whether the pursuit of happiness,
which is always relative, is the proper goal of psychiatry.
For good or bad, I view the shift towards further diag-
nostic expansion and neuroenhancement as inevitable so
long as the technology to make people “better” exists.
However, to what extent this trend should be sanctioned
in the DSM requires careful thinking by developers
about pragmatic implications in different contextual are-
nas. DSM’s main utility may be as a clinical guide, but
the reality is that DSM diagnoses are widely used (and
misused) for non-clinical decisions.
Allen Frances responds: practical pragmatism
I often get asked this question – whether practical conse-
quences should play an important role in DSM5 decisions.
My quick answer is a very emphatic yes – pragmatic con-
cerns must play a central role in shaping any DSM.
Why is this the case? DSM is an official system of clas-
sification that has a huge (perhaps excessive) influence
on how everything works in the mental health world –
who gets diagnosed, how they are treated, who pays for
it, whether disability is appropriate, and whether some-
one can be involuntarily committed, released from legal
responsibility, or sue for damages. DSM also has a di-
verse influence on public policy – directly or indirectly
influencing things as varied as the way scarce treatment
and school resources are allocated, the impact of medica-
tion on the obesity/diabetes epidemic, and how sexual
offenders are (mis)handled in the legal system.
Ever since the introduction of DSM-III, the DSM sys-
tem has been a great promoter of psychiatric research
and the principal means of translating across the clin-
ical/research interface. But, DSM is decidedly first and
foremost a clinical document, with its other uses being
important, but definitely secondary. As an official
diagnostic system, DSM is not meant to place its highest
priority on promoting or facilitating the latest in research
ideas. Because it has such a powerful influence on real
life (and occasionally even life or death) decisions, DSM
can't ignore its practical consequences – intended or un-
intended. It has to be workaday – trying very hard not to
make mistakes that will hurt people, rather than having
fancy but untested "paradigm shifting" ideas that almost
always wind up doing more harm than good.
Which brings us finally to the question of how best to
make DSM decisions. Much has been written about the
‘validators’ of psychiatric diagnosis and how they should
influence DSM. The problem is that available informa-
tion on the validators for most diagnoses is usually
equivocal and inconsistent – validators never reach out,
grab you by the throat and say "Do it this one way or the
science gods will be displeased."
To my mind, by far the most important validator is
how will any decision help or harm patient care, given
the foreseeable circumstances under which it will be
used. Let's go back to how this practical, common sense
approach works for the boundary between unipolar and
bipolar disorder. Start with the facts that there is no bio-
logical test to make the distinction and no certain way to
know what the appropriate ratio should be among mood
disorder patients. We do know one important fact. The
ratio of bipolar diagnoses at least doubled since the
introduction of Bipolar II in DSM-IV and the extraordin-
ary drug marketing campaign promoting antipsychotics
and mood stabilizers. This has undoubtedly helped some
people and harmed some others – the exact extent of
each is unknown and perhaps unknowable. But my bet is
that this is a fad that has overshot – they always do. I
would assume that anyone now presenting with anything
suggesting equivocal bipolar disorder is much more
likely to be overdiagnosed and overtreated than to be
missed. Close watchful waiting in doubtful cases beats
rushing in with potentially dangerous meds.
DSM-5 should always take full account of the risks, not
just the benefits, of getting a diagnosis and factor in the side
effects and complications of the real world treatments (usu-
ally medication) that will follow. Those working on DSM-5
must take responsibility for the practical consequences that
their decisions will have on peoples' lives.
Many people are troubled by the fact that an evalu-
ation of practical consequences necessarily plays such an
important role in making DSM decisions. They would
prefer that these be settled somehow more ‘scientifically’.
What they fail to appreciate is that the scientific data
underlying descriptive psychiatry never provides a clear
and unique right answer about where to set diagnostic
boundaries. All else being more or less equal scientific-
ally (which it almost always is for the kinds of boundary
questions we are discussing), by far the most important
Phillips et al. Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2012, 7:8 Page 11 of 16
http://www.peh-med.com/content/7/1/8deciding factor should always be: is this change (as it will
be applied in the average expectable practice environ-
ments) more likely to help or hurt patients? Or in other
words – what is more dangerous here, missing the diag-
nosis or overdiagnosing.
Of course, these decisions are always subject to differing
interpretations of the available data and the possible extra-
polations from it – but this is what a thorough risk/benefit
analysis is all about. We have to live with the fact that here,
as in so much of medical decision making, the science can
only take us so far and never jumps off the statistical tables
to provide us with the single, right answer.
Response to Dr Kinghorn: Dr Kinghorn’s extremely
penetrating critique of my position – that my pragmatism
lacks normative values and a vouchsafed method – cuts
straight to the heart of the matter and is devastatingly ac-
curate and impossible to dispute. His critique is so telling I
will quote its central portions again to provide the em-
phasis it deserves: "But his insightful account begs the im-
portant question: who should decide? Who should decide
what ‘mistakes’ and ‘problems’ are, or what ‘mental dis-
order’ is, or what constitutes ‘harm’, or what would render
DSM ‘useful’? Should patients decide? Should individual
psychiatrists decide? Should the Task Force decide? And
on what grounds? And how would we know if the judg-
ments of any of these potential ‘deciders’ were shaped,
subtly and unconsciously, by particular forces such as
pharmaceutical marketing, consumer-driven ideals of
beauty and success, gender stereotyping, and so on?"
The essential problem of utilitarian pragmatism is that
it often lives case by case, without clear external value
guidelines of the good or even the best methodologies
for establishing what those guidelines should be. Suppose
a drug for schizophrenia improves life, but in the process
shortens it – who decides how the utilities should play
out? In deciding whether to add a new diagnosis for
"psychosis risk syndrome," one pragmatist may worry
more about the lost benefit for false negatives of not hav-
ing the diagnosis; another (I think wiser) pragmatist
about the treatment burden on false positives if it is
included. The Benthamite utilitarians tried to solve this
conundrum with "the greatest good for the greatest num-
ber" and developing metrics for "good" is now part of be-
havioral economics. But as Kinghorn puts it, the basic
question is often begged – who decides the values, goals,
and methods of utilitarian pragmatism and how?
Back to Dr Kinghorn's telling words: "It is difficult to
see how Frances’ pragmatism can ensure that diagnostic
revisions will 'do no harm' if 'harm' is itself a contested
category. If, as Frances argues, efforts to establish a con-
sensual and non-tautological account of 'mental disorder'
are likely to fail, there would seem to be no way around
these questions. Psychiatric diagnostic classification, that
is, must be understood as a pragmatic and tradition-
constituted enterprise in which individuals and groups
with particular interests interpret research data (itself
compiled and reported by individuals with particular
interests) in such a way as to shape the use of psychiatry
and psychiatric technology in accord with these interests.
This recognition should, at the very least, provoke hu-
mility and non-defensive soul-searching among those
tasked with revising the DSM, since biases and moral
failures in the 'deciders' would very likely become mani-
fest in their nosological decisions, and the ongoing cul-
tural acceptance and use of the DSM hinges on the
ongoing public credibility of these 'deciders’."
Right on. But to where? The DSM's have come to as-
sume enormous (probably too much) influence in widely
diverse decisions that impact greatly on public health,
the distribution of scarce mental health and school
resources, and even the protection of constitutional
rights. The scope and strength of influence of DSM has
grown far beyond what anyone could have envisioned
thirty years ago. The American Psychiatric Association
has sponsored the DSMs for sixty years, taking on the
task originally because no one else wanted to be both-
ered with anything so insignificant. It seems clear now
that the importance and scope of the psychiatric diagno-
sis has outgrown its being comfortably nested within a
single professional organization. The sorting of different
values and weightings in making tough pragmatic
choices require much wider consensus.
If not the American Psychiatric Association, then who
should be responsible for future revisions in the diagnos-
tic system? There is no clear right answer. My best (but
far from perfect) choice would be the National Institute
of Mental Health. NIMH would bring a far broader view
to the task and be less burdened by publishing concerns.
But NIMH also has limitations. It would tend to be too
research-focused, less sensitive to practice concerns, and
not necessarily representative of larger public policy and
forensic issues. So my choice would be NIMH supervi-
sion of a very inclusive and transparent process.
None of this really answers Dr Kinghorn's fundamental
point. Nor can it be answered. Given the current state of
psychiatric knowledge, there are rarely clearly right
choices based on a cut and dried science base, and the
proper course of pragmatism is often in the eye of the
beholder. The safe play is to be aware of risks and poten-
tial blind spots and to build in a lot of checks and bal-
ances. In an uncertain world, your worst critics are often
ultimately your best friends.
Response to Dr Porter: Dr Porter makes the import-
ant point that diagnostic decisions must necessarily be
based not only on science and pragmatics, but also
sometimes on difficult ethical tradeoffs. This is especially
the case when, as is often true, the science is inconclu-
sive and the practical consequences are both positive and
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noses (see Dr Pierre on "psychosis risk") that may be very
helpful for some people, but also may trigger the massive
overuse of potentially dangerous medications for those
who don't need them.
Real world and ethical concerns must always be given
a great deal of weight especially when excessive reliance
on a weak science base may result in disastrous, unin-
tended practical consequences. The most egregious
current example of ignoring this common sense precept
is the dangerous over treatment of a wildly expanded
misdiagnosis of childhood bipolar disorder.
Response to Dr Paris: Dr Paris is rightly concerned
that some voices in psychiatry have been seduced by the
neuroscience revolution. They attempt to borrow its au-
thority to make excessive claims for the scientific under-
pinnings of clinical psychiatry generally, and for DSM-5
specifically. Such true belief in "science" (and over-selling
its contribution) helped germinate the misplaced ambi-
tion of DSM-5 to effect a "paradigm shift" in psychiatry.
Unfortunately, the rapid expansion in our understanding
of brain function has had little impact on either psychi-
atric diagnosis or clinical practice. Indeed there is some
useful science available to guide diagnostic decisions, but
it is often sorely incomplete in answering the crucial
questions that must be included in any serious risk bene-
fit analysis: what effect will this change have on the over-
all rates of the disorder and on the rates of false positive
diagnosis? How effective will treatment be? How harmful
will treatment be? What is the natural course without
treatment? How do we balance the possible benefit of
diagnosis and treatment for true positives versus the po-
tential harmful effects for everyone, but particularly the
false positives. Lacking precise answers to these ques-
tions, decisions must be based on best guesses on prac-
tical implications and "do no harm" caution – not an
appeal to an often incomplete and uninformative
"science."
Response to Dr Pierre: While agreeing completely
and enthusiastically with Dr Pierre's penetrating analyses,
I do have one disagreement with his conclusions. Dr
Pierre sees performance enhancing, cosmetic psychiatry
as basically inevitable and potentially useful – already
evidenced in current liberal prescribing habits and cer-
tain to expand much further as new psychiatric diagno-
ses (and a lowering of thresholds for existing ones)
expand the realm of mental disorders and shrink what-
ever is left of normality. End result – performance-en-
hancing pills will likely become increasing ubiquitous.
I agree with Dr Pierre's prediction of the bright future
of cosmetic psychiatry and the profits it will afford to the
drug industry. But I feel a strong need to oppose this
trend. My first objection is on practical grounds of effi-
cacy and safety. Most of the perceived performance
benefit to be gained from psychotropic medication by
those who are mildly ill or not ill at all will probably be
due to illusory placebo effect – but the side effects, cost,
stigma, and loss of a personal attribution for success will
be quite real. Often harmful treatments based on all
sorts of nostrums and snake oils have always been a part
of medicine and will find their grand revival in cosmetic
psychiatry.
On more technical and professional grounds, our
current FDA regulatory approach to drug approval
requires there be an indication for treating a definite dis-
order, not for enhancing a skill or for recreation or for a
pick me up. If, as a society, we choose instead a "Brave
New World" approach of ubiquitous medication manage-
ment, then this should come only after wide discussion
of the profound policy implications. Cosmetic psychiatry
should not result from the combination of diagnostic
creep (suggested by well-meaning but misguided experts
in psychiatric diagnosis) and aggressive marketing pro-
moted by much less well-meaning drug companies. If,
after adequate consideration, our society decides that
everyday performance enhancement is the way to go, I
would personally disagree but accept the policy change.
My point is that a decision of this consequence should
not rest with any group of medical professionals or with
the drug companies.
Conclusion
Allen Frances’s response to the third question – whether
to take a conservative or activist attitude toward change
in the DSM – is consistent with his responses that pre-
ceded it. Put simply, if current science does not match
well with the existing DSM categories, and altering the
categories will not improve that match, why change
them? Why not leave them alone until science, as pos-
sibly with the NIMH Research Domain Criteria (RDoC)
project, offers us guidance as to how to change them?
And this argument regarding the existing categories can
be made in bold for the proposed new categories. With
minimal scientific foundation they continue to escalate
the medicalizing of human difference; and in the case of
sub-threshold conditions like Attenuated Psychosis Syn-
drome, they increase the ranks of false-positive diagnoses
and the exposure of non-ill individuals to powerful psy-
chotropic medications.
Frances is less clear about his position when it involves
diagnoses such as the paraphilias that are more value-
laden and dependent on the judgments of public moral-
ity, and whose status as psychiatric disorders may not be
decided by future science. In defense and explanation of
DSM-IV, he offers the historical context in which he and
his Task Force felt it was important to maintain the
high-threshold standard for change in the case of all
diagnoses. He acknowledges that this may have resulted
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“sunsetted.” He ends with a useful proposal: although in
the case of controversial, value-laden diagnoses like anti-
social personality disorder and pedophilia we may not be
able to decide on their validity in a strictly scientific way,
we could try to find a way to measure whether leaving
them in the nosology does more good or harm.
Among the commentators, Scott Waterman and Mi-
chael Cerullo are striking in that they end in such differ-
ent conclusions from the same starting point. They both
begin with recognition that the DSM categories don’t
match contemporary science. Cerullo concludes, like
Frances, that this is a warrant for being conservative with
changes in the DSM categories until their scientific sta-
tus is clarified. Waterman draws the opposite conclusion
that the categories should be altered to reflect and facili-
tate ongoing research. Although Waterman’s recommen-
dation to eliminate the axial system and pare down the
number of categories is certainly arguable, Frances still
questions whether, in the current atmosphere of inad-
equate science and all the other proposed changes for
DSM-5, altering the current DSM will do more harm
than good. Frances also remarks on Waterman’s under-
appreciation of the current manual, but in defending the
manual he does not address Waterman’s specific con-
cerns about the difficulties of teaching the DSM in its
current form. For my part, given Waterman’s severe cri-
tique of his chosen example, DSM-IV major depression,
I would like to see his vision of a diagnostic construct of
major depression that would accomplish all that he
would like from a DSM revision.
In his commentary Andrew Hinderliter takes up the
other side of this question, the value-based diagnoses.
He makes a cogent argument for questioning and remov-
ing some of the paraphilias.
The fourth question, that of pragmatic considerations in
developing a nosology, easily connects for Frances to the
questions thus far discussed – and adds a further dimen-
sion to them. In their current form the diagnoses are shaky
creations with uncertain scientific backing; they are a mot-
ley group that can’t be neatly grouped together around
one clear definition of mental illness; and we have already
cautioned that in this state of affairs we should be guarded
both in modifications to the existing categories and in
introduction of new categories. Let’s now add that in all of
this discussion - how we think of diagnoses, how we define
them, and how we change them - we should pay great at-
tention to the consequences of our actions on the indivi-
duals receiving the diagnoses. The first and last principle
here is: First, do no harm. Thus, when considering change
to the nosology, we should consider the relevant science,
but we should also consider the practical effects on
patients. Imagined conflicts between science and pragma-
tism usually evaporate in the face of scientific uncertainty
that is balanced by pragmatic considerations. For an easy,
uncontroversial example that I described above, major de-
pression requires two weeks of symptoms and five of nine
diagnostic criteria. Lengthen the required period of active
symptoms from two to four weeks or expand the needed
number of criteria from five to six, and you have reduced
the population, inevitably creating fewer false positives and
more false negatives. Science will have a voice in such a
decision, but will never get it exactly right, because there is
no ‘exactly right’. A risk/benefit analysis involves practical
considerations of false positives and negatives, along with
our differing tolerance for each.
The four commentators are all in broad agreement
with Frances that practical, pragmatic considerations
play a role in the construction of psychiatric diagnoses,
both in the current state of our inadequate science, and
at a future point when the science is more secure. War-
ren Kinghorn leads off with a provocative question that
captures our respondent’s attention: namely, in this exer-
cise in assigning priorities to what practical considera-
tions will be highlighted in a particular diagnostic
construct, who will decide? In questions that can’tb e
answered with simple empirical evidence, will we turn
the decision-making over to the Task Force, the APA As-
sembly, a specially appointed committee, the patients,
whom? It goes without saying that there is no definitive
answer to this disturbing question.
In his discussion Douglas Porter uses the terminology
of values to emphasize the normative dimension of diag-
nostic constructs from the outset. We don’t do science
and then pragmatics. Our science has a normative di-
mension from our first moment on the proverbial bench.
Joel Paris adds that we have become dazzled by a neuro-
science that has thus far offered us minimal guidance,
and that in the meantime we should continue adjusting
our nosology in a practical way and adjust the DSM ac-
cordingly. Finally, Joseph Pierre ends with a provocative
issue that again catches Frances’ attention. He argues
that in the real-life world of clinical work we tend to
treat the suffering that presents itself in our consulting
rooms, with minimal regard for whether that suffering
matches the thresholds of our categories; and he then
argues that this diagnosis-creep will inexorably lead to-
ward cosmetic enhancement. To be sure, he is taking us
where many of us, Frances included, don’t want to go.
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